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ABSTRACT 
This repmi covers the effect of safety factors on the time taken for humans to escape a 
building where fire has initiated. Monte Carlo simulation is used to detem1ine the 
probability of failure to escape in a given fire scenario. 
The simulations indicate that the safety factor is very influential upon the probability of 
failure to escape. The major effects upon egress are ranked in this order of significance; 
time taken for the occupant to decide to leave the building after hearing the alam1, the 
time until conditions are too hostile for human survival, and the time until the fire is 
detected. The occupant's travel speed to leave the building has such a low level of 
significance that it should be treated detem1inistically in future studies of this type. 
Where a safety factor of two is applied there is a reasonable probability of failure. 
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1. Introduction 
How safe are the typical detenninistic designs for human egress? How safe are they 
when a safety factor of two is incorporated? What happens to life safety when a safety 
factor other than two is used? How can life safety be detem1ined? To detennine the 
safety of escape route design, current design has to be examined. To examine current 
design methods a method of analysing human egress is required. How can life safety be 
examined? In tem1s of the probability of design failure or by the loss of life? This project 
detennines a method for examining human egress. Then an examination of current 
design and the safety factors employed is perfonned. 
1. 1. Background for design of escape routes 
Design of an escape route implies that the occupants of the building escape from the 
building before conditions threaten their lives. The time to leave the building must be 
less than the time to untenable conditions, so: 
!esc < tun 
where 
tesc = time taken to escape from the point of ignition 
tun =time until untenable conditions occur after ignition 
We require knowledge of these times. When an escape route is designed, we do not have 
the knowledge to detem1ine these times, so engineering judgement is used to --choose 
deterministic values. 
Time to escape is composed of some physical factors and numerous human factors. The 
factors are the time until the fire is detected, the time for occupants to respond to the 
ale1iing system, and so on. 
The time until untenable conditions occur is detem1ined by fire dynamics and untenable 
conditions. Untenability can be determined by the toxic effect of the fire environment on 
the occupants, the convective heat or radiative heat. In design the smoke layer height is 
typically used to mark untenability, which is when the smoke layer has gone below head 
height. 
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Due to the uncetiainty attached to human factors, as well as uncertainty in detection, the 
design equations for egress contains a factor to counter the uncertainty (FEDG 1994): 
tesc• SF = tun 
where 
SF = the safety factor = 2 
The origin of the safety factor appears to have no experimental basis. In design of an 
escape route this factor has the potential to be abused because of its multiplicative nature, 
when combined with the uncertainty associated with human egress. Designers can use a 
smaller safety factor than what is specified (FEDG 1994), whereas a stnaller safety factor 
will increase the probability of design failure. The increase in the likelihood of fatality is 
examined in this report. The effect of modifying the safety factor has not been examined 
so a designer modifying the safety factor has no evidential support of what adjusting the 
factor will do. 
Fire engineering design is perfom1ance based, so a perfonnance model of human egress 
is required. Tllis is where a quantitative risk assessment model can be useful, because it 
will determine the perfom1ance and can account for variables that have a distribution 
attached to them. Cunent design uses detem1inistic design values. Deterministic design 
lacks the knowledge of the distribution of the input variables, and does not have a 
probability of failure attached to it. 
1.2. Objectives 
The objective of this report is to determine what the probability of failure will be for 
differing safety factors. Failure is the failure to protect the life safety. All egress designs 
have a probability of failure. Therefore, finding an acceptable level of relative safety 
between the different safety factors will be detem1ined. The safety factor is applied as a 
safety margin because the distribution of the total time taken to evacuate the building 
would be distorted if the safety factor were to be applied multiplicatively. 
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The approach taken to examine the safety margin is to use a Monte Carlo simulation 
approach to determine the probability of failure. Using a variety of input distributions 
that effect the total time taken for a person to escape from the building being examined. 
Untenability limits are detennined from a detem1inistic physical fire model, FAST 
version 3 .14. Three compartments are modelled in FAST: the room of fire origin, the 
room of occupant origin, and the corridor. The results of the physical fire modelling are 
used in detennining the untenability time in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
Limitations imposed on the fire modelling include assuming; that the room of fire origin, 
the window in the room of fire origin, the room of occupant origin, and the escape door 
from the corridor are open. The windows and doors that are treated as being open are for 
the ventilation in the FAST fire modelling. Occupant travel distance is a constant. The 
escape door is treated as a vent going to the outside, as is the window in the room of fire 
ongm. 
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2. Review of existing literature 
This chapter covers a number of papers that have contributed directly to the area of 
evacuation modelling utilising quantitative risk assessment methods. 
For concepts on risk based design and decision analysis Ang and Tang (1975) is highly 
recommended. The risk based concepts in this repmi make use of the concepts in that 
publication. 
Fire Code Reform Centre (1996) published Figure 1 in their Fire Engineering Guidelines. 
This is a system for deciding to escape with the consequences of this system detailed. A 
more simplistic model has been used in this project. 
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Figure 1 System for decision to exit building with consequences, Fire Code Reform 
Centre (1996) 
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2. 1. Fire Safety Design Based on Calculations 
Uncertainty Analysis and Safety Verification 
Magnusson et. al. (1995) gives an excellent overview of the cunent methods that can be 
applied in risk analysis. 
The paper gives a list of the general fire safety sub systems present in a building. It then 
covers what factors will detem1ine the available safe egress time (ASET), and moves 
onto an event tree that describes the different fire scenarios. The scenarios that could 
occur are based upon activation or failure of active and passive fire safety systems 
relevant to safe egress. 
The next stage is the definition of a limit state equation for which failure is dete1mined by 
the output of the equation being negative. This limit state equation gives time for smoke 
filling to head height (1.6m), detection time, response and behaviour times, and 
movement time. 
Knowledge unce1iainty and variability (stochastic unce1iainty) are also defined. It is an 
important distinction where uncertainty has originated. This allows the definition of 
which components of variability can be reduced by knowledge, or if the variability is 
inherent in the variable being examined. Then the uncertainties are analysed. 
The repmi covers all the available methods for risk analysis and where they are 
appropriate. This allows selection of the appropriate tool without time being expended 
on analysis which is inconect for the problem being examined. An examination of 
available software is minimal, but the software examined is still available and useful. 
Safety checking by the derivation of partial safety coefficients is detailed. This is a 
description of the influence of variables and how their influence can be detennined. This 
leads to the output of a ~-index value. 
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It contains a list of main building types for analysis, which is small and simple but does 
cover a large number of stmctures. These ideas can be easily adjusted to similar building 
types, if need be. 
An example of one of the building types, places of assembly, is perfom1ed. This example 
includes awareness times and the probability of an exit being blocked. The exit blocking 
is simple, but reasonable. A calculation model is demonstrated and the input distributions 
and the values (mean and standard deviation) are shown. Some of the input values are 
not completely justified, but the values are not unreasonable. 
Response surfaces for the different scenanos are designed, though the method for 
defining the response surfaces were not detailed. The response surfaces would generate, 
from the alpha value of the e design fire, detection and untenability times. The response 
surface data used here originated from CF AST modelling. So, the time until untenable 
conditions occmring is developed from physical modelling. 
Unceliainty analysis by five different methods was perfom1ed on the response surfaces 
and limit state equation defined earlier. The output from each of these methods was then 
compared. The output from each method was in the fonn of probability of failure. 
This paper is very useful for understanding all of the available methods and covers an 
example of a large place of assembly. This paper is useful for both functional and 
theoretical purposes. 
2.1.1. Awareness Time 
Magnusson et. al. (1995) suggests an awareness time to be calculated in the following 
manner; if the occupants have a good view of the fire then a lognonnal(10s, 5s) 
distribution is used. The lognom1al function uses the first value as the mean of the 
lognormal distribution of awareness time, and the second value as the standard deviation 
of the distribution. If the occupants do not have a good view of the fire, and if the fire 
alam1 is operating then a DETACT-QS time is used. If the alarm is not operating then 2 x 
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DETACT-QS is used. DETACT-QS is a quasi-steady state program for calculating 
thennal detection times. The program calculates the temperature at the thennal detector 
from quasi-steady plume equations. DETACT -t2 uses a non steady-state equation for 
calculation of temperature. The equation used is for t2 fire growth, which is a time based 
heat release equation. The t2 equation uses time squared, multiplied by a selected 
constant (the a value) and the heat release at that time is calculated. 
That method gives the time where awareness of the fire occurs but does not consider the 
time taken for people to hear the alarm until they make the decision to leave the building. 
DETACT-QS is only a quasi steady-state calculation, DETACT-t2 wouid be preferred for 
the case of t2 fire growth. The detection time calculated is only for them1al detection 
devices. So, this calculation does not take into account the smouldering fire scenario 
where a smoke detector would detect the smoke pmiicles before the fire reaches a growth 
phase approximately equivalent to a e fire. 
2.1.2. Time until movement 
Magnusson et. al. (1995) selected a movement time with a distribution of nonnal(300s, 
300s). This is an extremely flat distribution, with a mean of 300s and a standard 
deviation of 300s. Using a distribution with such a large distribution of times is likely to 
make the probability of failure more likely and reduce the safety index. The large 
knowledge uncertainty that is contained in this distribution will make the time available 
to escape from the building, in a large number of cases, no time or negative time to 
escape. That will increase the number of failures in Monte Carlo simulation, the 
equivalent in the usage of ~-indexing is a reduction of the ~ value. A negative time for 
movement does not make practical sense, therefore we assumed that this distribution is 
truncated to prevent the occurrence of negative outputs (though this is not stated in the 
paper). This is an area that requires a significant level of investigation to reduce the 
knowledge uncertainty. 
2.1.3. Doors 
Magnusson et al (1995) utilised engineering judgement for the likelihood of an escape 
door being blocked, unfamiliar, and if the fire is close to the door. 
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The movement times for escape were based upon the flow that was possible through 
doorways. 
2.1.4. Type of Occupancy 
Magnusson et al (1995) focused on places of assembly, health care facilities, and hotels. 
Thus the number of occupants is expected to be large (in the region of 600 or more 
people). 
The area being investigated by Magnusson is a large room with an exit or multiple exits. 
2.1.5. Results 
The conclusion reached was that the underlying uncertainty involved in the calculation 
meant the common design criterion of~ = 2 could not be met. 
That conservative choice of distributions may have led to the calculated safety levels 
being low. 
Figure 2 shows the failure percentage of the eight scenarios used in their study, these 
results are for a large stadium with or without alanns and sprinklers. 
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Figure 2 Probability of failure for 8 scenarios using monte carlo simulation also 
showing merged results from an event tree (Magusson et. AI. 1995) 
Figure 3 shows the safety index determined by the First Order Second Moment (FOSM) 
method, the ~ values are for the exact scenarios shown in figure 1. 
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safety index[·] 
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Figure 3 Safety index beta for 8 scenarios using monte carlo simulation also showing 
merged results from an event tree (Magnusson et. al. 1995) 
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2.2. Fire Safety Risk Analysis of a Hotel 
Frantzich (1997) is a case study of one of the building types specified in the report by S. 
Magnusson et. al. (1995), specifically a standard hotel building. 
The report specifies a corridor with standard hotel rooms all with doors leading into this 
corridor. Each end of the corridor has a stairwell, providing two independent exits. 
Details of the probability of fire per year in a hotel are defined. Risk is described from 
two standpoints which are both are useful in deciding what the acceptable risk to a person 
may be defined as. The first is individual risk. Individual Risk is defined as the risk to a 
person per year. Thus, the time spent in the hotel should not exceed this risk level. The 
other approach is that of Societal Risk. Societal Risk is defined as the risk of a multiple 
fatality fire. 
The method of comparison for societal risk is on an F-N curve. An F-N curve has on one 
axis the probability of failure. On the other axis it has the number of fatalities. Some 
European countries have some defined lines on the F-N curve which should not be 
exceeded in design. Something that can be detem1ined from an F-N curve that a lisle 
calculation will not show is the likelihood of a large number of fatalities. Where there is 
a large number of fatalities, even though the risk (probability multiplied by consequence) 
is acceptable, this may be an unacceptable loss to the perception of the general public. 
Figure 4 shows a dotted line, which is the mean of their data. The hand drawn line 
ranging from 10 to 100 people being affected and from the point of 10 people being 
affected to the probability of 1 o-5 is the Dutch limit. This line should contain the data 
shown (the black line). The 80 %-tile shows that their analysis of a hotel, in 20% of 
cases, fall outside of the Dutch limit. They pointed out that the average case in their 
simulations were inside the Dutch limit. So the hotel analysis meets the Dutch limit. 
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Figure 4 Typical F-N Curve with the Dutch Limit Imposed (Frantzich 1997) 
Practical details of implementing individual and societal risk methods is then covered in 
considerable detail. 
Modelling surfaces are then stated, but the method that led to their creation is not 
explained in detail. The response surfaces are stated to have come from physical models. 
2.3. Fire Safety Risk Analysis of a Health Care Facility 
Frantzich (1996) covers risk analysis techniques applied to three Swedish Health Care 
Facilities. The detailing of a health care facility is of a different style compared with the 
other previous methods. 
Due to the complexities inside health care facilities there are an extensive number of 
possible scenarios. The complexity was so high that only one of four main branches was 
analysed in depth. 
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Probability of fire was detennined by specific data from individual facilities. 
The fire safety calculations were perfom1ed in a manner similar to the hotel corridor 
scenario. Fire growth conditions were based upon parametric equations utilising e fire 
growth rates. Failure surfaces were detennined from CFAST modelling. The model 
CF AST is produced by the National Institute of Standards and Teclmology and is freely 
available. The model perfom1s calculations based upon zone modelling of compartments 
and utilises e or user defined heat release rates. Detection times were determined from 
DETACT-t2, then tumed into a spreadsheet equation, in a similar manner to the CFAST 
modelling. 
Movement times incorporated the response times based upon staff reaction times. Event 
tree conditions include the mobility of patients, as this is a significant factor in a hospital 
envirmm1ent. Differing levels of mobility were accounted for and the staff resources 
required during the evacuation were accounted for. 
The results were based upon individual risk to a patient compared with n01111al risk of 
death faced by individuals. Limitations in the results and perfonnance were clearly 
stated. The model was only for one hospital ward. This is useful for probabilistic design 
purposes, but not necessarily for general conclusions about the fire safety of health care 
facilities. 
2.4. Risk Assessment of Timberframe Multistorey Apartment 
Buildings. 
Proposal for a Comprehensive Fire Safety Evaluation Procedure. 
Magnusson and Rantatalo (1998) examines risk assessment methods like ranking 
systems, checklists, narratives and probabilistic design. 
A policy-based risk ranking system is implemented. The general system used is specified 
in the SFPE Handbook. Of the papers available this appears to be the only one which has 
implemented this method in a practical manner for fire safety engineering. 
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There are considerable drawbacks to this approach. The weighting of the parameters that 
are detailed in the evaluation are determined by expert opinion. Probabilities calculated 
from this method do not originate from physical fire modelling. 
The Gretener method for risk ranking is examined and compared with existing methods. 
Some probabilistic methods are mentioned including FiRECAM, CRISP II (the previous 
two titles are risk assessment packages for fire safety), and quantitative risk assessment. 
No practical information for the use of these is stated. 
This paper examines a number of topics lightly but contains no substantial quantitative 
risk assessment infonnation. 
2.5. Uncertainty in smoke transport models. 
Lundin (1997) contains physical smoke modelling that was performed, then modelling of 
an identical compartment in CF AST modelling. The results compare the differences 
between a real compmiment and the vi1iual compartment. 
This experiment demonstrated a mean over prediction of temperature by 25-40%, and an 
under prediction of the measured interface height by 10-40% in the compartment. It is 
stated that these differences are average and that a conclusion cmmot be drawn because o! 
the size of the random en·or involved. Statistical analysis was perfmmed. 
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Figure 5 Predicted interface compared with measured interface (Lunden 1997) 
Figure 5 shows that the predicted interface height from CF AST is further from the ground 
than in the experimental tests, in the late stages. This means that a layer height prediction 
of 1.5m from the ground happens earlier in experimental tests than the modelling. In the 
early stage, where the interface is higher, the measured interface is further from the 
ground than the modelling. 
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Figure 6 Measured and predicted temperatures versus time (Lunden 1997) 
Figure 6 displays a more rapid increase in temperature in the modelling than in 
experimental work. This means that an untenability prediction based upon temperature 
will occur before the temperature condition is likely to occur. 
This paper does point out the large amount of random error contained in the -GF AS+ 
modelling which is useful to understand when perfonning such physical modelling. 
Although the version of CF AST that was being used was not stated, but appears to be an 
earlier version. Depending on the revision the physics applied in the model they were 
using may be different from the current version. Despite the large amount of random 
enor some of the modelling perfonned in papers contained in the literature review make 
corrections based upon this document in their modelling. 
2. 6. The Swedish Case Study. 
Different Fire safety Design Methods Applied on a High Rise Building. 
Jonsson and Lundin (1998) compares current fire safety design with the existing 
prescriptive building guidelines. There is only the one scenario used in the building 
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design, but different approaches to designing the same building to this level of 
functionality. Then describes a risk based verification method perfonned on this 
building, there is a note of a risk based design method that is not included in this report. 
It is available in another repmi that we have not studied. 
Swedish building regulations are detailed in their cunent structure. 
All the design methods are specified in reasonable detail. The risk based verification is 
based upon an F-N curve derived from an event tree. The design crite1ia for this type of 
design is specified by a maximum F-N curve marked on their diagram. This line puts a 
maximum cap on what probability is maximum and for each probability what the 
maximum number of fatalities can be. The integral of the line's area would have a total 
risk that would exceed an acceptable level. The combination of a risk calculation and the 
F-N curve method would be valuable for design purposes. The detail required is the level 
of individual risk and a calculation of societal risk. Perfonning an analysis to this level 
for this is very resource consuming. 
The building design is detailed to the standard of a real building design. The design fires 
are specified, and all evacuation data is stated for each scenario, especially values of 
reaction times. Some values appear from the BSI guide for the probability of failure of 
the different fire safety systems examined, some calculated, and manual evacuation and 
no alann reaction times are assumed. The available staircases in each scenario are 
specified in six scenarios and five engineering design methods. 
A cost comparison is performed which is interesting. An interesting cost comparison is 
performed where fire safety engineering generally comes out cheaper than the Standard 
Swedish methods. There is no evaluation of the comparative safety of each of these 
design, although that is subjective. 
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2. 7. Draft Technical Report. 
Part 1: The application of fire performance concepts to design objectives. 
Standards Australia (1998) have included a chapter on probabilistic design, which is an 
advancement in standards. This report states a generalised fire safety design process 
including safety objectives, codes of practice and the type of data required. 
The major problem with this report is that it lacks practical content. The repmi does not 
cover probabilistic design for human egress. The report examines a general idea for 
establishing the overall level of uncertainty for allocating an appropriate safety factor, but 
it does not state what criteria would be approp1iate. It does however put the safety factor 
applied to professional judgement and peer review with an infom1ed understanding of the 
limitations of the chosen scenarios, models and data. 
This document states that "probabilistic procedures often lack the teclmical detail and the 
full use of fire science fundamentals found in the detem1inistic procedures." This report 
does not cover probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods that require the use of fire 
science and does not include Monte Carlo design. 
In Annex D, of the draft report, a probabilistic design equation that covers the number of 
deaths in a given fire scenario does not make sense in tenns of probabilistic risk 
assessment. The number of deaths in a given fire scenario will be a pmi of a calculated 
distribution. This equation can only make sense if incorporated into a risk equation, 
where this equation is the consequence. A probability of that number of fatalities is 
required and then the output from this would be an FN-curve. This would be an 
examination of societal risk, but no reference is made to societal risk, nor to individual 
tisk. The equations stated do not appear to be practically implementable. 
This document needs further clarification and probabilistic risk assessment concepts to be 
applied to the probabilistic design section. 
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2.8. Conclusion 
There are a number of methods for risk assessment available. These methods give a 
probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of failure, and utilise probabilistic parameters. 
It is necessary to have data to define the parameters, therefore it is necessary to know 
what data is available for well-defined classes of buildings (Magnusson et al1995). 
For design purposes it is necessary to link risk calculation procedures and the design 
fmmat (Magnusson et al 1995). Therefore knowledge of cunent design procedures and 
finding a link in a risk assessment methodology to evaluate the risk of the design is 
valuable. 
The different fire safety systems for the purpose of egress in a building are broken down 
into six sub-systems (Magnusson et all995). These systems are the; 
• calculation of fire growth in the room of fire origin 
• calculation of smoke spread to other compartments 
• calculation of spread of fire to other compartments 
• calculation of detection and activation of active systems 
• fire brigade communication and response 
• calculation of evacuation times 
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3. Simulation modelling 
This chapter examines the components required for a simulation model. For a model that 
uses a limit state equation (for detennining failure) inputs are required to detennine if the 
limit of the equation has been exceeded or not. This gives the binary detennination of 
failure or success. 
Reasons for the failure of an evacuation design 
The design failure condition of escape is the envirmm1ent becoming untenable. Failure 
occurs when the following time based variables exceed the time until untenable 
conditions: 
• Alerting time (or detection time) 
• Time for activation of warning system 
• Decision making time 
• Travel time 
The time taken for occupants to evacuate (tesc) in the modelling in this project is the sum 
of; alerting time, time for activation of warning system, decision making time and travel 
time. 
Understanding the fmmer variables, with a formalised methodology for egress design, 
should reduce the likelihood of a deficient egress design. 
This project has one limit state inequality. 
tun- tesc ~ 0 
Where tun = available egress time until untenable conditions occur 
tesc =time taken for the occupant(s) to evacuate 
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Figure 7 Distribution for escape time and untenability time. 
Figure 7 shows two distributions with an overlap. Assume one distribution is the 
distribution of the time to untenability and the other is a distribution of egress time. The 
bottom axis is time taken. Where the two distributions overlap this is the failure region, 
which means failure is possible. This research has utilised this idea, but has used a fixed 
untenability point, which gives the failure region. This research's egress time distribution 
is composed of three input distributions including travel velocity, detection time, and 
decision making time. 
So what is a deficient egress design? When designing for egress the objective is to avoid 
the failure condition from occuning. The failure condition is that of exceeding the limit 
of the limit state equation. 
3.1. Determination of failure 
This project has one limit state inequality. 
Where tun = available egress time until untenable conditions occur 
tesc =time taken for the occupant(s) to evacuate 
When the inequality is exceeded then failure of the equation occurs. The failure means 
that the occupant(s) remaining are trapped, incapacitated or dead. 
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Analytical models that only have one limit state equation have two risk prediction 
methods available, the First Order Second Moment (FOSM) approach and Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
For this project a scenario has been chosen. The scenario is based in the office level of a 
University of Canterbury Building. It is assumed to be a single story building to meet the 
requirements of the Building Code Handbook (Building Industry Authority 1995). 
This scenano was simulated using a Monte Carlo simulation. The reason for Monte 
Carlo approach being used is the simplicity of performing a large number of iterations. 
The iterations allow an outpnt distribution to be formed from the input distributions and 
the limit state inequality. From the output distribution the probability of failure can be 
dete1mined, which is the failure point of the limit state inequality (when time remaining 
to escape is zero). Using the FOSM approach would require the usage of a mathematical 
methodology, this is prone to human enor, and it is difficult to make small changes. 
Monte Carlo simulation using the @RISK package in Excel allows small changes to be 
made, and a large number of differing distributions to be utilised in the limit state 
inequality. The simulation will also demonstrate the number of times the limit state 
inequality's failure condition was met. Thus a failure probability can be determined 
without mathematical analysis. 
These simulations were based upon physically derived inputs. 
The inputs used are: 
• Detector activation time 
• Untenability time (from FAST modelling) 
• Time until conditions become untenable 
• Reaction time 
" Travel speed 
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Knowledge uncertainty and variability 
There are two types of uncertainty that a statistical population contains; knowledge 
uncertainty (that is due to a lack of knowledge about the pmiicular system, Type B 
uncertainty), and variability (stochastic unce1iainty, randomness, Type A unce1iainty). 
Knowledge uncertainty occurs where random or systematic enor occurs 
Variability can be reduced by increased knowledge of the random variable and 
approaches to reduce the variance (like increasing the sample population, etc). This is 
where latin hypercube sampling (rather than random sampling) is useful in Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
Latin hypercube sampling breaks the output of a simulation into discrete outputs. In this 
way stratification of the model outputs gives separation of variability :from knowledge 
unce1iainty. The effect of this on Monte Carlo simulation is the reduction of the number 
of iterations that must be used to achieve convergence of the outputs. 
3.2. Monte Carlo simulation in egress design 
Monte Carlo simulation is generally a system described by a number of random 
distributions. A computer is used to generate the random numbers that fit these 
distributions. Where a large number of random numbers are generated characteristics of 
the system can be examined. The accuracy of the simulation is generally improved by an 
increased number of iterations. The output(s) can be described as distributions or 
pmiicular values or ranges of outputs can be examined. For example, where an egress 
design fails to provide enough time to escape, the number of times the escape fails can be 
simulated by a Monte Carlo simulation, or where a structural members fails to support its 
load during an earthquake or fire. 
When utilising the risk analysis approach of Monte Carlo simulations there is always a 
probability of failure. Failure must be a set condition with definition, which is the 
purpose of the limit state equation. A particular concem is what is an acceptable level of 
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failure. The acceptable level of failure is a trade off between the risk to life safety, and 
the cost of implementation of safety systems. 
When exammmg the acceptable level of failure. Society's perception of what 1s 
acceptable must be evaluated. 
The probability of failure in this repmi is conditional on the environment specified in 
each scenario occuning. Therefore, a pmiicular fire scenario must occur with the 
particular ventilation conditions, and room dimensions. The probability is also dependent 
on the time taken to escape and the detection time. There is also the factor of knowledge 
unce1iainty that contributes to the probability of failure. Knowledge uncertainty will 
increase the probability of failure through the lack of knowledge about an input 
distribution (like decision making time), this will give probabilities of failure that are 
more than the actual real world probabilities. 
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4. Definition of Risk 
This section defines the risk that is being calculated and the limitations of this approach. 
An altemative approach is acknowledged but that method has a higher level of difficulty 
in detem1ination and evaluation of the inputs, as well as what the acceptable output of 
that method would be. 
4.1. Risk in fire safety engineering design 
Risk is defined as: 
Risk= Probability x Consequence 
Where risk is applied to fire safety engineering the consequence is the 'damage' caused 
by the fire. Where damage is looked at in terms of prope1iy loss, or loss of life. The 
probability is the likelihood (ie, on an annual basis, or the lifetime of building/person) of 
that consequence occurring. 
Risk can be defined as probability of a fire per year, deaths per year, or damages defined 
in monetary values per year. 
Distinction must be made between calculated risk and perceived risk. Public perception~ 
can differ substantially from the calculated risk. Social perception of acceptable risk is 
based on perception, rather than calculated figures. Differentiation between voluntary 
and involuntary risk has to be made. People will accept higher levels of risk to 
themselves if they perceive the advantages of the activity they are engaging in to be 
wmih the risk (Franzich 1996). 
In this research the consequence is the conditions either in the room where the occupant 
is or that particular individual's escape route becoming untenable. Failure occurring 
means one of the following states occuni.ng; the occupant is trapped, incapacitated, or is 
dead. The probability of failure, in the Monte Carlo simulations in this report, is the 
proportion of simulated escapes that fail. Failure is determined by a limit state equation, 
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which has a failure limit based upon, whether there is enough time to escape or not. The 
simulations that exceed the limit of this equation detennine the failure probability 
4.2. Risk 
Individual Risk is the pmbability that the .. undesired .consequence will affect that 
patiicular person. The level of individual risk alters as the variables in the simulation are 
altered. Changing of door states (open or closed), ventilation sizes, door widths, number 
of doors, location of fire, and the many other variables that exist in the real world system 
of a building all affect the individual risk. 
Society wants each individual to have a certain level of risk to life. This level of risk (or 
safety) limits the level of risk the individual is exposed to. 
The likelihood of major or catastrophic failures, which have a large loss of life, has 
considerably lower probability of failure than individual fatalities. These catastrophic 
failures must still have the same level of risk as individual risk. 
Societal risk takes the number (or distribution) of fatalities into account. The 
consequence in this case is multiple fatalities. The probability is of the likelihood of a 
patiicular number of fatalities occurring, and is evaluated for all fatalities. 
The practical calculation of this level of risk is ve1y work intensive, and reqmres 
complete risk analysis of every component of human society. This level of data 
collection and analysis is too work intensive to be realistically considered. Information in 
many areas would have extremely high knowledge uncertainties as to defeat the purpose 
of the calculation. 
However, this approach can be applied to whole buildings if not only the risk to the 
individual is calculated, but if the risk to multiple individuals is perfom1ed. J:his would 
entail the failure event containing infonnation on the number of fatalities as well as the 
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failure occunence. This does not fully calculate societal risk, but the societal risk to the 
individual could be calculated for the time that is spent in the building in question. 
This repmi does not calculate societal risk. Individual risk is calculated instead. The 
individual risk calculated is for a given scenario occmTing, for which the probability of 
that scenario occuning has not been calculated to detem1ine that actual individual risk. 
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5. Risk Methods 
5. 1. Risk Ranking 
Risk Ranking systems cunently exist for Hazard and Risk Assessment. These systems 
are based upon expe1i opinion and existing knowledge of risk to life (Watts 1995). 
Values are assigned for variables for particular buildings. The values obtained give the 
building a particular rating on a ranking system. The numbers used for ranking are not 
necessarily indicative of the actual probability of fatality. These systems also place the 
classification of life safety into discrete categories. 
5.2. Narratives 
The earliest form of risk assessment are nanatives. Which are simply an observation that 
something can cause ham1, like fire (Watts 1995). Such observations do not quantify 
what level of danger exists. A nanative will convey that something should be avoided. 
This does not necessarily show how to avoid the danger. A nanative is still used in 
egress when one occupant conveys to other occupants that they should evacuate a 
building because it is cunently on fire. 
5.3. Checklists 
Checklists identify impmiant features for safety. However evaluating a patiicular 
building with a checklist will not necessarily determine a patiicular level of safety. The 
list does not necessarily allow the flexibility to design a building for life safety in a cost-
effective manner (Watts 1995). 
Using checklists helps in fulfilling recommendations of safety practices. It does lack the 
ability to quantify the risk, and can be impractical in new or unusual systems that the 
checklist is applied to. Check lists are advantageous by their simple design, which can 
allow a person with minimal training. 
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5.4. Probabilistic Methods 
Probabilistic methods have become more sophisticated due to the increase of available 
data and mathematical techniques. These methods allow the manipulation of fire safety 
variables according to recognised theory. Simulation and stochastic modelling are useful 
methods to analysis the effect of variables, and the effectiveness of fire safety scenarios 
(Watts 1995). 
These methods can be slow to calculate and are prone to human enor. When designing 
something by a probabilistic method and it does not meet design criteria, there is a large 
amount of work to recalculate the new design. These methods are advantageous because 
of the quantitative output from the methods. 
5.5. Safety index jl-methodology 
This methodology is a capacity/demand based methodology. This is where demand and 
supply have distributions that overlap in a region, which is called the failure region. 
M=R-S 
Where M = safety margin 
R = supply capacity 
S = demand requirement 
If R and S are random distributions then M is also a distribution. 
The most probable failure point (probability of failure) is easily determined by the First 
Order Second Moment (FOSM) method. Unfortunately, the FOSM method gives no 
indication of the distribution of output. It does quantify the risk into a safety index. 
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5. 6. Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to simulate a scenario in a probabilistic environment. 
The simulation requires probability density functions for inputs. · The probability density 
functions can be in the fonn of a nom1al distribution, although many other distribution 
types are possible. 
For engineering using a limit state equation is useful. If you have a steel beam that will 
fail at a ce1iain loading and the probability of the loading is known. Then the limit state 
equation will fail by its limit being reached or exceed. A simulation study of this type 
will give the probability of failure but a distribution of that failure can be detem1ined. 
Usage of computer packages like @RISK allows statistical analysis. This allows the 
determination of which variables have the most effect of contributing or reducing the 
likelihood of failure. Unlike analytical teclmiques, the input variables can be easily 
altered to produce more infmmation about the failure distribution or probability. 
There is a distinction between two types of Monte Carlo simulation (Magnusson 1995). 
Simulation without making a distinction between knowledge uncertainty and stochastic 
variability (inherent variability). 
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6. Modelling 
The approach taken and values/distributions used in the modelling are defined in this 
chapter. Every input that has been used the scenario modelling is noted and described 
here. The limit state inequality is defined. The methodology applied is systematically 
listed. The actual usage of the methodology is described. 
The modelling enviromnent is detailed, including all the disttibutions. The physical 
modelling dimensions are shown, along with the tenability limits applied to the scenarios. 
The layout of the building is shown with the configuration of the environment and the 
occupant. 
6. 1. Limit State Equation Target 
Design usage of the limit state equation will have to be less than a specified target 
probability. 
p(M(X!, ... , Xn) ::; 0) < Ptarget 
p(f) =Probability of failure in the limit state equation. 
M =Safety margin. 
X1..n =Random variable. 
Ptarget =Target probability for failure. 
Cunently there is no defined target for probability of failure in New Zealand. The 
comparisons in the modelling results are relative to the other modelled scenarios. Only 
the following section of the limit state equation target is used: 
p(M(X1, ... , X 11) ::; 0) 
6.2. Methodology 
1) The time to untenability must be detennined: 
a) The room configuration being modelling is selected. 
i) The door state is defined for the room of fire origin. Whether it is door or 
closed. 
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ii) The room height is defined. This must be accurate for modelling. 
iii) The floor area is defined. This must be accurate for modelling. 
iv) The vent areas and the height from the floor and total height must be defined. 
These also need to accurate for modelling. 
b) A FAST or CF AST simulation must be run on this building configuration. 
c) The output from the model must include Tel evant data for dete1111ination of 
untenable conditions. For example, if a Fractional Equivalent Dose (FED) 1s 
being calculated then species concentration must be switched on for the output. 
d) Process the output to detem1ine the time when conditions have become untenable. 
e) This will give the time for the corridor becoming untenable. This is the area that 
the occupants are expected to be inside of while evacuating the building. 
i) An exception is where the room of fire origin is closed. Some way of 
calculating door bum through would have to be used. This type of modeling 
has not been covered in this research. 
ii) If the door bums through or a window breaks in the time scale of evacuation 
then this would need to be simulated and vents adjusted. In this model the 
ventilation has been assumed to be static. 
2) The total time for an occupant to escape must be calculated. In this research one 
occupant with a fixed travel distance has been used. This calculation could be 
perfonned on multiple people with differing travel distances, then the probability of 
multiple fatalities could be calculated, but this is not covered in this research. This is 
the calculation method: 
a) Detection time is calculated. 
b) Decision making time for the occupant is calculated. 
c) The average travel velocity is calculated. 
d) These times are added. The total time is the time taken for this occupant to escape 
in this particular simulation. This is the total time taken to escape (tesc) 
3) The total time taken for escape (tesc), from (2), is subtracted from the time until 
untenable conditions occur (tun), from (1 ). This is the time available after escape. 
The limit in place from the limit state inequality causes the following outcomes from 
the simulation: 
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a) If the time available after egress is less than or equal to zero, then the failure 
condition has occmTed. The occupant can be considered dead, incapacitated or 
trapped. 
b) If the time available after egress is more than zero, then the failure condition has 
not occurred. The occupant has escaped the building safely. 
4) The output from the simulation package is used to detem1ined the probability of 
failure. Which is the probability of zero time available after egress. If the probability 
of failure is not acceptable then the design must be altered until it is. This 
determination is not made in this research. Currently the values are compared in a 
relative manner to their equivalent safety factor or safety margin. 
6.3. Usage of methodology 
The time to untenability is detennined by geometrically defining the physical modelling 
area. The definition of height, ventilation size and design fire growth rate is important. 
The door state (whether it is open or closed) must be noted. 
A CF AST simulation is run on the configuration. Untenability conditions must be 
selected. The output from the model must contain the relevant infom1ation for meeting 
the untenability condition. 
The untenability time becomes one of the inputs into the limit state equation:, wliere_tli_e-
untenability time is tun· The untenability condition must be for the compatiment that the 
occupant will be in at that particular time. For simplicity in this modelling the untenable 
conditions are always determined in the corridor. 
The total time for the occupant to evacuate from the building must be calculated from the 
detection time from ignition, the time taken to decide to evacuate the building, and the 
distribution of travel velocity. These times are added together to determine the total time 
taken to evacuate the building. The decision making time includes any pre-evacuation 
activities that occur after the alarm, and it is the time before actively attempting to leave 
the building. The time taken to evacuate the building is taken as a constant travel 
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distance, but uses a travel velocity distribution to dete1mine the time taken to leave the 
floor. Once the occupant has left the floor they are assumed to be in an environment 
protected from the effects of smoke for long enough to leave the building. Therefore, the 
occupant is considered safe once on the stairway, and the stairway is assumed to be safe 
and unhindered for egress. 
Once suitable inputs for the distributions of detection time, decision making time, and 
evacuation speed have been defined then the Monte Carlo simulations can be run. The 
output of these simulations have a distribution of time available for escape, and where 
that time is zero on the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the time to escape, 
that is the probability of failure. 
6.4. Modelling environment 
6.4.1. Building 
The building used in the modelling is a partial area of one floor level of the Civil 
Engineering building at the University of Canterbmy. The particular section isolated 
would be separated by automatically closing fire doors upon detection of a fire. The 
dimensions are similar but not exact. The domway leading from the conidor goes into a 
stairwell that has connected smoke stop doors and fire rated walls. In the context of the 
simulation the stairwell is considered to be safe from fire. In building design.-this--i& 
unacceptable, except for mobility impaired people for which this is a refuge until rescued. 
The floor consists of a long conidor with a number of equally sized rooms connected to 
the conidor. All the doors are assumed to be closed in the event of fire. Except for the 
room of fire origin. This door is assumed to be open because of the time scale of the 
simulations, where the time scale for untenable conditions is short compared with a door 
burning through. 
Figure 8 is a layout of the floor modelled. The circle is the occupant, the capital F is the 
room of fire origin, and the X on the left hand side of the conidor is the exit. 
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Figure 8 Floor plan of the building floor modeled 
This floor complies with the New Zealand Building Code Handbook, annex C (1995). 
When the purpose group is WL (Working, Light hazard) as a single .story building the 
required fire resistance rating is FO (no fire resistance rating). A fire safety design would 
compartment the rooms off with a fire rating, that would include door closers. This 
would change the physical modelling set up. Modelling of rooms with closed doors has 
not been performed because of the added complexities associated with modelling door 
bum-through, and fire spread. 
6.4.2. CFAST Modelling 
The rooms and corridor have their surface materials defined as; gypsum for the walls and 
ceiling, and plywood for the floors. This is an assumption of typical building materials. 
Table 1 shows the dimensions of the compartments that were used in the FAST 
modelling. 
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Room Depth Width Ceiling Height 
(m) (m) (m) 
Fire origin 2.5 3.6 2.5 
Other 2.5 3.6 2.5 
rooms 
Corridor 2.2 20 3 
Table 1 Physical dimensions of the rooms modelled 
Table 2 shows the ventilation used on the compartments for FAST modelling. 
Room Width Height Connects 
(m) (m) to 
Standard room 0.95 1.9 Corridor 
Room of Fire 0.95 1.9 Corridor 
Origin 
Room of Fire 1 1.1 Outside 
Origin 
Corridor 1 2 Outside 
Table 2 Vent sizes for compartments 
6.4.3. Untenable Conditions 
The evacuation of the occupant(s) from any of the rooms on the floor and from the 
conidor into the stairway must be completed before conditions become untenable. If not, 
they are trapped or dead. 
Toxicity assessment of combustion products was done by fractional equivalent dose 
(FED) (Purser 1995). The species concentrations come from the output taken from 
FAST. None of the carbon to hydrogen or other chemical ratios were altered in FAST. 
The FED level considered untenable was set to 0.25 FED. Modelling papers (Frantzich 
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1997) set the FED to 0.5. The value of0.25 was selected by judgement to be a level that 
would ensure that the occupant would survive. 
Convective heat in the lower layer (or if the upper layer has dropped to 1.5m) of 65°C 
was considered untenable (FEDG 1994). Radiative heat, where the upper layer reaches 
200°C was considered untenable. 
Table 3 displays the limits imposed for untenable conditions to occur. If any one of these 
conditions is met in the conidor compartment then it is considered untenable. Fractional 
equivalent dose (FED) was only measured for the upper layer. The FED measurement of 
0.25 is not typically used in research papers (usually 0.5) but was assumed that the 
occupant would have little chance of surviving if the FED went above this. The radiative 
heat limit is only measured by the upper layer (FEDG 1994). The convective heat was 
measured from the lower layer until the layer height had dropped to 1.5m. In the vast 
majority of simulations, the convective heat was the condition that would be met. 
Untenability condition Condition 
limit 
Fractional equivalent dose 0.25 
Convective heat too high 65°C 
Radiative heat too high 200°C 
Table 3 Untenability limits 
It is likely that the usage of these numbers will produce results on the safe side of the fire 
environment. This may bias the probability of fatality in the results. So an alternative set 
of numbers is used in the sensitivity analysis section to compare how choosing such 
numbers will effect the probability of failure. The alternative numbers are chosen based 
upon the lmown limits of exposure that will cause a fatality. This will be the best 
knowledge that we cunently have, which is ultimately limited by differences between 
individuals. What may affect one person may not affect another, depending on a variety 
ofhuman variables. 
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6.4.4. Specification of design fire 
Three design fires were chosen to examine the difference in probability of death. A slow, 
medium and fast fires were chosen to use for the ext2 design fires. Where the ex values are 
as follows: 
Slow: ex= 0.00293 kW/s2 
Medium: ex= 0.01172 kW/s2 
Fast: ex= 0.0489 kW/s2 
The relationship of this type of fire detem1ines the rate of increase of heat release from 
the fire. Heat release from the fire is time dependent. When this heat release curve is 
used with a fire modelling program such as FAST other physical factors are calculated. 
Ventilation becomes important and ultimately (in the case being examined here) limits 
the heat release from the design fire. However, untenable conditions are likely to occur, 
by the imposed design limits, before any such limiting of the fire is a major effect. 
6.4.5. Time to untenable conditions 
If any one of the specified untenability conditions occur, then the environment is 
considered to be untenable for human life. Once the condition is met then if there are any 
occupants they are trapped or dead. The calculation was done through a set of 
spreadsheet cells to make sure the calculations were consistent. 
Table 4 contains the calculated values for untenability. These results are from the output 
from FAST modelling. 
Time to Untenability (s) 
Fire Growth Standard Short Layer FED Ventilation Ventilation 
Rate scenario corridor height condition medium high 
only only 
Slow 350 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Medium 190 160 150 350 320 360 
Fast 110 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Table 4 Untenability conditions 
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In modelling the untenability time was nonnally distributed with a coefficient of variation 
of 0.3, so the distribution would have a standard deviation of 0.3 multiplied by the mean. 
6.4.6. Detection time 
Detection times were determined from DETACT-e calculations. DETACT-t2 uses an 
unsteady state calculation to determine a detection time for a thennal device. The1mal 
detection is the only physical model that is readily available and is based on physical 
effects. Smoke detection is typically done by thennal analogy. The them1al analogy 
approximates smoke detection for a rapidly growing fire. For the case of a smouldering 
fire, detection may occur before there is any significant them1al change.- This would make 
the detection time much longer for the thermal analogy, for detection, than what it would 
be in the real situation. 
The usage of the thennal analogy for smoke detection will, in ce1iain cases, yields a 
building that has a higher probability of fatality in the model. This will occur where there 
is a fire that goes through a smouldering stage, where the smoke pmiicles would be 
detected by the smoke detector long before the them1al analogy would predict smoke 
detector activation. This extended time for smoke detection will increase the probability 
of fatality to more than what it would actually be. An attempt to compensate for this was 
by making an assumed smoke detection time in one of the simulations. 
The version ofDETACT-t2 used is the one contained inside of FAST 3.1.4. Detection 
within the modelling was not used, only the DETACT-t2 component. 
Detectors in the building are thermally activated sprinklers. These sprinklers were 
modelled with an activation temperature of 65°C and a Response Time Index (RTI) value 
of 100. 
Table 5 contains detection times obtained by running DETACT -t2 on the room of fire 
origin's dimensions, with a design fire selected. 
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RTI Slow (s) Medium (s) Fast (s) 
100 210 130 72 
50 180 110 63 
Table 5 Detector activation times calculated from DETACT-t2 
Where scenario 5 entails the usage of a smoke detector, the fire is assumed to have been 
smouldering before the medium fire growth rate occurs. To allow for this, judgement has 
set the mean time of detector activation to 30 seconds. This assumes that the 
smouldering has occurr-ed in a period before the time scale of this modelling. In 
modelling the detector activation time was distributed with a coefficient of variation of 
0.3, so the standard deviation would be 0.3 multiplied by the mean value. The nonnal 
distribution of detection time is truncated to times between 0 sand 2500 s for the purpose 
of negative values occurr-ing in detection time, which would not make physical sense. 
6.4.7. Occupant movement time 
The model cunently only covers an individuals probability of fatality, so movement 
modelling is based upon one occupants movement. Movement time was taken from a 
stairway velocity data (Pauls 1995). Mean data points were around 1m/s per metre of 
stair width. A stair width of 1.5m was assumed, although the model's stair width is listed 
as 2.2m this does not appear to give a realistic value for a single occupant approximation; 
The extremes of the distribution went from 0.6 rn/s per meter of stair width to 1.2 m/s per 
metre of stair width. Using the stair width of 1.5m the mean becomes 1.5 m/s, the 
extremes of the distlibution become 0.9 rn/s and 1.8 m/s respectively. 
Based on those data points the extt·emes are treated as three standard deviations from the 
mean in a normal distribution. The mean is taken as the mean for that distribution. 
This normal distribution was chosen which has a mean of 1.5rn/s and a standard deviation 
of0.1 rn/s. 
Nmmal(1.5 rn/s, 0.1tn!s) 
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The con-idor length of 20 meters is used for the total travel distance. The only time the 
distance is different is where the short con-idor has been modelled at 1Om. The corridor 
length is also the travel distance of the occupant. 
6.4.8. Occupant response time 
The response time was selected from a paper that included a response time distribution to 
an almm system (Magnusson 1995) which used a lognom1al disttibution and has a mean 
of 130s and a standard deviation of 120s. The response times are all truncated to times 
between 0 s and 2500 s to stop negative response times from occmTing, which do not 
make sense in the context of these simulations. 
LogNonnal(l30s, 120s) 
The paper also included a response time for no alam1 system that was taken from expeti 
judgement from the Swedish Fire Service (Magnusson 1995) of: 
LogNormal(300s, 300s) 
Where a shoti response time has been used the following distribution has been applied: 
Normal (30s, 30s) 
Lecture notes from MacLem1an (1998) contain a graph of a probability distribution for 
the time to start movement to exit the building as a weibull distribution. Investigation 
into this type of response time should be perf01med. 
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7. Results 
Thirteen scenarios were chosen to test the effect of altering the variables for this model. 
In each scenario a range of safety factors are examined. The safety factor is a 
manipulation of the total time for the occupant(s) to escape. For a safety factor of two the 
occupants escape time is halved. This is for simplicities sake. The actual referenced 
values are used when the safety factor is equal to one. 
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Table of Scenarios 
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Fire Growth slow X 
medium X X X X X X X X X X 
fast X 
Corridor Length short X 
long X X X X X X X X X X 
Detector Type smoke X 
thermal X X X X X X X X X X X 
Response Time short X 
log normal X X X X X X X X X X 
Movement Speed slow X 
medium X X X X X X X X X X 
fast X 
Untenability condition smoke layer X 
height 
thermal X X X X X X X X X 
FED X 
Ventilation low X X X X X X X X X X 
•-n-~ -
medium X 
high X 
Table 6 Configuration of all scenarios 
Each scenario contains a range of safety factors that have been employed in the 
modelling, as shown in table 6, where a safety factor of one is the umnodified scenario. 
This probability of failure, where the safety factor is one, is the actual probability of 
fatality (given that the input values are true distributions). This probability of failure is 
conditional on the given medium growth fire scenario occurring, with the ventilation 
conditions as they are in the model and remaining static. Where a different safety factor 
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has been used the Cumulative Frequency Distribution (CDF) has been translated. This 
translation mimics the modification of design to allow a higher safety factor in design. 
7. 1. Scenario 1 
Scenario one is the basic scenario that uses a medium fire with the standard compartment 
dimensions. The human movement times are the standard ones chosen for this 
modelling. This uses a medium growth rate t2 design fire. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.743 
1.2 0.586 
1.5 0.409 
2 0.222 
2.5 0.127 
Table 7 Probability of failure for scenario 1 with varying safety factors 
7.2. Scenario 2 
Scenario two uses a slow design fire. All other variables are maintained from scenario 
one. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.469 
1.2 0.321 
1.5 0.183 
2 0.079 
2.5 0.043 
Table 8 Probability of failure for scenario 2 with varying safety factors 
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7.3. Scenario 3 
Scenario three uses a fast design fire. All other variables are maintained from scenario 
one. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.880 
1.2 0.774 
1.5 0.619 
2 0.396 
2.5 0.273 
Table 9 Probability of failure for scenario 3 with varying safety factors 
7.4. Scenario 4 
Scenario four uses a short conidor length. This modification is made both in the physical 
fire modelling and in the occupant travel distance. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.831 
1.2 0.709 
1.5 0.533 
2 0.307 
2.5 0.188 
Table 10 Probability of failure for scenario 4 with varying safety factors 
7.5. Scenario 5 
In this scenario an assumed distribution for a smoke detector was chosen. The smoke 
detection time has no physical basis. Whereas all the other scenarios are based upon 
DETACT-t2 detection times. 
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Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.344 
1.2 0.261 
1.5 0.168 
2 0.089 
2.5 0.053 
Table 11 Probability of failure for scenario 5 with varying safety factors 
7.6. Scenario 6 
In this scenario the short decision time is used. This time is designed to approximate the 
response times of what fire safety designers use, as an actual response time, rather than 
using the lognormal response time, which more closely emulates human response times. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.418 
1.2 0.255 
1.5 0.128 
2 0.048 
2.5 0.022 
Table 12 Probability of failure for scenario 6 with varying safety factors 
7. 7. Scenario 7 
Scenario seven uses an altered mean travel velocity of 2 m/s, which is called a fast 
movement speed in the table of scenarios. 
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Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.728 
1.2 0.581 
1.5 0.400 
2 0.211 
2.5 0.120 
Table 13 Probability of failure for scenario 7 with varying safety factors 
7.8. Scenario 8 
Scenario eight uses a mean movement speed of 1 m/s, which is referred to as a slow 
travel speed in the table of scenarios. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.761 
1.2 0.620 
1.5 0.423 
2 0.229 
2.5 0.136 
Table 14 Probability of failure for scenario 8 with varying safety factors 
7.9. Scenario 9 
Scenario nine only uses the layer height condition to trigger untenable conditions. The 
standard scenario (scenario one) uses three conditions to test untenability. 
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Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.880 
1.2 0.780 
1.5 0.607 
2 0.372 
2.5 0.231 
Table 15 Probability of failure for scenario 9 with varying safety factors 
7. 10. Scenario 10 
Scenario ten only uses Fractional Equivalent Dose (FED) to determine untenability. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.257 
1.2 0.177 
1.5 0.099 
2 0.043 
2.5 0.022 
Table 16 Probability of failure for scenario 10 with varying safety factors 
7.11. Scenario 11 
Scenario eleven has the same configuration as scenario one except that the ventilation in 
the corridor to the outside is triple in width. This triples the corridor's external 
ventilation. 
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Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.330 
1.2 0.218 
1.5 0.125 
2 0.056 
2.5 0.030 
Table 17 Probability of failure for scenario 11 with varying safety factors 
7. 12. Scenario 12 
Scenario twelve uses increased ventilation like scenano eleven. Except that the 
ventilation from the coiTidor to the outside is increased by five times from the coiTidor 
ventilation of scenario one. 
Safety Factor Probability of 
failure 
1 0.256 
1.2 0.166 
1.5 0.090 
2 0.039 
2.5 0.021 
Table 18 Probability of failure for scenario 12 with varying safety factors 
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7. 13. Summary 
Summary of Scenario Failure Probabilities 
1 
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Figure 9 Summary of all modelling results 
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The results in figure 9 can only be compared in a relative mam1er. An event tree of the 
possible scenarios has to be evaluated to compare these results by individual risk. In this 
modelling the benchmark for comparison is the standard design scenario one. -Theeffec'Ts 
studied are for a safety factor of one. All the other results are a translation of this result, 
which is designed to be the real situation, so their effect is dependant on the shape and 
distribution of the time available after egress distribution. 
The scenarios that are worse, in a relative comparison with scenario one, are scenarios 3, 
4, 8 and 9. Scenario three has a fast fire growth, this growth is expected to cause higher 
likelihood of fatality if it is not controlled. Scenario four has a short corridor length. The 
shorter corridor, 10 metres instead of 20 metres, will halve the volume of the corridor. 
The occupant travels half the distance of scenario one, but it appears that the halving of 
corridor volume has a larger effect upon probability of fatality than shortening movement 
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distance. Scenario eight has a slower occupant movement speed, the mean speed being 1 
m/s compared with 1.5 m/s in scenario one. This does not appear to have much effect as 
also shown in scenario four with the shorter movement distance. Scenario nine has a 
similar probability of failure compared with scenario three, where the design was a fast t2 
fire, though the only change made was using only smoke layer height as an untenability 
condition. This rapid untenability condition has probably come from the effect of having 
only a low level of ventilation in the compartments modelled. 
The only scenario that has a result similar to the standard scenario one is scenario seven. 
In scenario seven a fast movement speed, with a mean of 2 m/s, was used. This marginal 
improvement of increasing the movement speed supports the minor effect of slowing the 
movement speed in scenario eight, and the marginal effect in scenario four. 
Scenarios 2, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12 all give a very significant increase in the level of safety 
determined by Monte Carlo simulation. The effect is more significant than in the 
previously discussed scenarios. This may just be an effect of where the data has been 
sampled from the time available after egress distribution, which requires further 
examination of the distributions. Scenario two makes use of a slow t2 design fire, and as 
expected the effect is a reduction in the probability of failure. Scenario five uses a smoke 
detector, the detector is an assumption with a large standard deviation, but this F:ives the 
expected result of reducing the probability of fatality. Scenario six is a reduction of the 
human response time, where the decision to exit the building after hearing the alarm is 
reduced, which gives the expected result of reducing the likelihood of fatality. Scenario 
ten uses a fractional equivalent dose of 0.25 as the untenability condition, compared with 
convective heat triggering untenability in the vast majority of cases. This is not 
necessarily expected but it suggests that in most of the results here that the fire 
enviromnent is insufficiently ventilated. The FED of 0.25 is not typically used by 
designers either 0.5 or 1.0 are used that would give a slightly improved safety level to a 
building. Scenarios eleven and twelve both have increased levels of ventilation to the 
outside. The effect of this is (as expected) a much lower probability of fatality, m 
scenario twelve the convective heat untenability condition was not triggered first. 
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Figure 10 Regression Sensitivity for the Effect of Modelling Inputs on Time 
Available to Escape 
In figure 10, the most influential input for the model is occupant response time. 
Occupant response time has an R2 value of -0.86, which means that it correlates very 
strongly with reducing the time available to escape as occupant response time increases. 
Time until untenable conditions correlates positively to increasing the time available to 
escape with R2 = 0.41. This is as expected, although the contribution from the 
distribution may be different with refinements in modelling, the distribution of 
untenability is partially to deal with the unpredictability of the fire scenario and the 
variation in CFAST/FAST modelling results. The occupant travel speed correlates with 
R2 = 0.007. This correlation is so insignificant in influence that in future modelling 
should be treated as a deterministic value. What that value should be requires further 
investigation. 
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When examining the safety factors the mean time available after egress was not zero. 
This is unavoidable when actual response distributions have been chosen. The safety 
factor was just a modification of the total time taken to escape from the building. The 
scenario that was closest to zero was scenario 2. This scenario had a slow t2 fire growth, 
with the appropriate detection time calculated by DETACT-e. The mean time available 
to escape was -2.5s. This is close enough to zero to examine the actual effect of an 
egress design. The equivalent for a medium fire is scenario one with a safety factor of 
1.5, the mean time available after egress is 8s. This gives a probability of failure of 0.41. 
The probability of failure is lower than scenario two because of the more rapid response 
of a heat detector in a medium fire growth compared with a slow fire growth. 
When the safety factor is one the probability of failure is 0.469. Applying the standard 
safety factor of 2 (FEDG 1994) the probability drops to 0. 079. When the safety factor is 
2.5 the probability of failure is 0.043, which is almost half of the safety factor of 2. In 
contrast to these results, where the results give a low probability of failure (where these 
would be extremely low values when placed into an event tree of all scenarios). It is not 
unusual for designer to alter safety factors, in the survey results one designer decides if 
using a safety factor is appropriate and others do not use safety factors over the total time 
to escape the building. This can sometimes mean using a lower value for safety factor. 
When changing to a safety factor of 1.5 the probability of failure becomes 0.183. When 
shifting to a safety factor of 1.2 the probability of failure becomes 0.321, which is 
approximately three-quarters of the probability of a safety factor of one. 
The values used for scenario two are values that are averages. Designers use what are 
claimed to be extreme values. Typically, the time used with a safety factor of two is 
around 2 minutes at the maximum for an office, from the survey results. In the slow fire 
growth scenario these times are longer, including the extended detection time. This adds 
up to 7 minutes before the safety factor is applied. 
70 
8. Survey 
8. 1. Survey objective 
This survey is for the SFPE Task Group on the Standardisation of Perfonnance Based 
Design Criteria. The results will be published along the data collected from the United 
States. The intention of the questions is to detetmine what design values are being used 
by practicing fire safety engineers. This information is compared with the results of the 
modelling. 
8.2. Timed egress survey questions 
1) What country are you based in? 
2) What region are you based in? 
3) How many projects a year involve building designs which include timed egress fire 
hazard analysis? 
4) What criteria do you use for tenability (e.g. CO, C02, 0 2 , HCN, visibility, radiation 
from upper layer, temperature oflower layer, etc.)? Please list all criteria and provide 
references if applicable. If the criteria varies depending upon the building occupancy 
please indicate the specific occupancies (e.g. business, residential, educational, etc.) 
and the corresponding travel speed(s). 
5) What occupant travel speed(s) do you use? If the speed varies depending up.on_the_ 
building occupancy please indicate the specific occupancies (e.g. business, 
residential, educational, etc.) and the corresponding travel speed(s). 
6) What occupant response time(s) do you use? If the time varies depending upon the 
building occupancy please indicate the specific occupancies (e.g. business, 
residential, educational, etc.) and the corresponding response time(s). 
7) What factors of safety do you employ and how do you use them? If the factors vary 
depending upon the building occupancy please indicate the specific occupancies (e.g. 
business, residential, educational, etc.) and the corresponding factor(s) of safety. 
8) What computer programs do you use to estimate fire growth and development and/or 
time to untenable conditions? 
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9) Do you have a standard design fire? If so, \Vhat is it? If the design fire varies 
depending upon the building occupancy please indicate the specific occupancies (e.g. 
business, residential, educational, etc.) and the corresponding design fire. 
1 0) Is the above information standardised within your organisation? 
8.3. Results 
1) What country are you based in? Responses 
New Zealand 8 
2) What region are you based in? 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Wellington 
Responses 
4 
3 
1 
3) How many projects per year? Responses 
(approximate) 
0-40 6 
41-80 1 
81-120 1 
4) What criteria used for Responses 
untenability? 
Layer Height 1 .5m 6 /7 
Convective heat 65C 317 
Radiation from upper layer 200C (or 5 /7 
2.5kW/m"2) 
Fractional Equivalent Dose (FED) 1 /7 
Not stated 1 /1 
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5) What occupant travel speed(s) Responses 
do you use? 
0-59 m/min 
60-69 m/min 
70-79 m/min 
80+ m/min 
2/8 
6/8 
8/8 
0/8 
6) What occupant response times do you Responses 
use? 
Office 0-30s 
31-60s 
61-120s 
121-180s 
Residential or sleeping occupancy 120-240 
241-360s 
361-480s 
Not stated 
Retail 90-150 
Not stated 
7) What safety factor do you Responses 
employ? 
2 
3 
Not stated 
6 
1 
1 
8) What computer programs do Responses 
you use? 
Branz Fire 
CFAST/FASTLite 
Evacnet+ 
2/8 
8/8 
1 /8 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
7 
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Firecalc 
Firesys 
Fire Simulator 
First 
FPE Tool 
9) What is your standard design 
fire? 
Office 
Residential 
usage of tA2 fire growth 
heat release curves (furniture or 
materials) 
4/8 
1 /8 
1 /8 
1 /8 
5/8 
Responses 
medium tA2 3 
fast tA2 2 
ultra fast tA2 0 
medium tA2 2 
fast tA2 3 
ultra fast tA2 1 
8/8 
1 /8 
1 0) Is this information standardised in your organisation? 
Yes 6 
No 2 
8.4. Discussion of Results 
All the designers that answered the survey were based in New Zealand. 
The designers were spread amongst Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. 
Projects completed per year were mostly in the under 40 projects category. 
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The conditions to detennine untenability is mostly layer height and radiation from the 
upper hot layer. Three of seven respondents use convective heat as the terminating 
condition for untenability. 
The movement speed range that is most commonly used is 60-79 m/min. The maximum 
ofthese results was ~ 7 6 m/min, so the actual range is 60-7 6 m/min. 
There is a significant spread of occupant response times for both office and residential 
buildings. It is apparent that there is no generally accepted response times for humans. 
The ranges presented in the survey results for occupant response times are the sum: of all 
factors used by a designer. This includes investigation time, decision making time, and 
any other pre-movement activities. 
Six of eight designers use a safety factor of two, one of eight uses a safety factor of three 
under ce1iain conditions. There is a level of variation ofwhat the safety factor is applied 
to. There is also a variation on where the safety factor is to be used, in some cases 
whether it is used at all. In some cases the safety factor is not used on the movement time 
of the occupant. 
The program that all designers had was CFAST/FAST/FASTLite. This program is also 
the program chosen for physical fire modelling for this project. 
It appears that a design fire, which is medium or fast for t2 fire growth, is typical in 
design. This depends upon the fire scenario being evaluated. All respondents used a t2 
fire growth in design, depending upon the occupancies or stored materials in the building. 
In six of the eight organisations, their design approach is standardised. 
The vast majority of designers are using a safety factor of two. Which is recommended 
by this report. 
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9. Conclusions 
9. 1. Discussion 
The three most influential factors, for this modelling, in influencing the probability of 
failure of design are the following inputs: 
• Occupant response time 
• Time until untenable conditions 
• Time until detection 
The input that is dete1ministic is: 
• Occupant travel speed 
Altering safety factors makes significant changes to the probability of egress failing. 
These changes can be very dangerous for life safety. 
Both the limits imposed on the model and the inputs for the model detem1ine the 
probability of failure. 
The time taken for activities after alann sounding, but before movement to leave the 
building, appear to be underestimated in detenninistic design calculations. The safety 
factor of two appears to compensate for underestimated time values for humai1 activities. 
From the sensitivity analysis, it appears that the occupant movement speed is 
insignificant when compared with the time to untenability, occupant response time, and 
the time taken until the fire is detected. 
9.2. Recommendations 
Designers should not alter safety factors and other accepted inputs or input distributions 
in calculations without justifying with experimental data and having an understanding of 
the systems involved in human egress. Changes without this understanding is likely to 
cause life safety to be reduced. 
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Safety factors in their cunent form (the survey in chapter eight, and the Fire Engineering 
Design Guide (1994)) should not be reduced until further research is perfonned into the 
effects on life safety have been more thoroughly examined. The majority of designers 
use of safety factor of two (75% of those surveyed), which is recommended by this 
rep mi. 
The conditional probability for the: giVen design fire, heat detectors, and no fire 
suppression by sprinklers, gives a conditional probability of failure between 5% and 40% 
for a safety factor of two. Compared with a safety factor of 1.5 which gives a conditional 
probability of failure between 10% and 60%. A safety factor of one which gives a 
conditional probability of failure between 25% and 90%. 
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10. Future Work 
• Finding the decision making time for New Zealand occupant groups, and the type of 
distribution more accurately models this time. 
• Reduction of the lmowledge uncertainty about human decision making time. 
• Physical fire modelling needs further refinement for detem1ination of untenability 
times. 
• To complete an event tree of the scenarios, and their probability of occurrence. This 
would allow the calculation of the life safety of an individual in a given building. 
• Development of a standard of acceptable risk to life safety, for an individual in a 
given building for the time spent in the building. 
• Determining a method for simulating a multiple occupant egress. This would 
detennine the number of fatalities in a given scenario. This infom1ation would allow 
a FN-curve for a building to be calculated. 
• Development of a standard for which the FN-curve would be compared to dete1mine 
whether the risk to life safety is acceptable. In te1ms of risk, and societies perception 
of risk. 
• The values used are not values from New Zealand data. Cultural differences and 
differing occupant groups are likely to give different distributions for modelling 
inputs. Therefore, New Zealand data should be collected to improve the accuracy of 
the probability of failure for New Zealand building design. 
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Scenario 1- Standard configuration 
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Scenario 2 - Slow e fire growth 
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Scenario 3 - Fast e fire growth 
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Scenario 5- Smoke detection 
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Scenario 6- Short human response time 
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Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1.2 
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Scenario 7- Fast occupant travel speed 
>. 
+-' 
..c 
<tl 
..c 
0 
I.. 
a.. 
~ 
..c 
<tl 
..c 
0 
I.. 
a.. 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
--
-
0 
0 
1'-
1 
0 
0 
1'-
1 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1 
··-·-------------. 
0 
0 
<D 
I 
0 
0 
I!) 
I 
0 
0 
't 
0 
0 
('/") 
I 
0 
0 
N 
I 
0 0 
0 
..-
I 
0 
0 
....-
Time Available (s) 
0 
0 
N 
0 
0 
('/") 
0 
0 
...q-
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1.2 
0 
0 
<D 
I 
0 
0 
I!) 
I 
0 
0 
't 
~ 
0 
0 
('/") 
I 
0 
0 
N 
I 
L 
I 
L 
I 
! 
L 
! 
_L 
L 
0 
0 
..-
I 
0 0 
0 
....-
Time Available (s} 
0 
0 
N 
0 
0 
('/") 
--~·-
0 
0 
...q-
0 
0 
I!) 
. 
0 
0 
I!) 
0 
0 
(0 
---1 
-+ 
0 
0 
(0 
98 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
~ 0.7 0.6 
..0 0.5 ctl 
..0 0.4 0 
1... 
a. 0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
~ 0.7 0.6 
..0 0.5 ctl 
..0 0.4 0 
1... 
a. 0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1.5 
l 
i 
-------------- ----j 
-:----_------·------=--_-__ -___ __ -_-_-=-__ =_-__ =_=-___ ===~-~!_'______ ----------~- - 1 
--------~+--/ _______________ -! 
-j------_._-¥-/0'/________ I 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1'-- <D l() 
I I I 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
~ ~ N ~ ~ N ~ ~ lO 
I I I I 
Time Available (s) 
0 
0 
<D 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2 
----
---
-
0 
0 
1'--
1 
' ' 
0 0 
0 0 
<D l() 
I I 
0 
0 
'1 
I 
/ 
1 j 
! 
I 
J 
I j 
~-------
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
~ N '" I I I 
0 0 0 
0 0 
~ N 
Time Available (s) 
---
0 
0 
~ 
----
-- --------~ 
·~ 
0 0 
0 0 
~ l() 
------
0 
0 
<D 
99 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
~ 0.7 0.6 
.c 0.5 1'1:! 
.c 0.4 0 
1-
a. 0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2.5 
-·----·-·--·~--·-··-·- __ j 
-·-----·---J I 
J 
i 
------------·---·-··- ··---. -·- -··-----·---1 
I 
-.·----··------- -------·----·---· 
---------------------·-----!---··---·-----~ 
-----------
0 0 
0 0 
1'- <D 
I I 
0 
0 
1.() 
I 
0 0 
0 0 
'<j" C0 
I I 
0 0 
0 0 
N ..-
I I 
i 
·---·--·--·----~ 
0 0 
0 
..--
0 0 
0 0 
N C0 
0 
0 
'<j" 
0 0 
0 0 
1.() <D 
Time Available (s) 
Scenario 8 - Slow occupant travel speed 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1 
1 .. 
0.9 - £ 
0.8 I f . ·~ -···t-
.~ 0.7 
~· 
I 0.6 
- f ·-.c 0.5 1'1:! c-· I .c 0.4 0 I --1-a. 0.3 
0.2 jl 
0.1 / 
0 ~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1'- <D 1.() '<j" C0 N ..-- ..-- N C0 ""<:t 1.() <D 
I I I I I I I 
Time Available {s) 
100 
~ 
.0 
fQ 
.0 
0 
...... 
a. 
>-
+' 
.0 
fQ 
.0 
0 
...... 
a. 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1.2 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 /-----------~~-~----
0.2 ---~~~---
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
t'-
I 
1 
0.9 -- ------
0.8 
0.7 -
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
I'-
I 
0 
0 
<D 
I 
0 
0 
lO 
I 
0 0 
0 0 
-.;t (Y) 
I I 
0 0 
0 0 
N ~ 
I I 
0 0 
0 
~ 
Time Available (s) 
0 0 
0 0 
N <"0 
0 
0 
-.;t 
0 
0 
lO 
0 
0 
<D 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1.5 
0 0 
0 0 
<D lO 
I I 
------1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-.;t <"0 N ~ ~ N <"0 "<:t lO <D 
I I I t 
Time Available (s) 
' ! 
101 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
>. 0.7 
-0.6 
..0 0.5 co 
.c 0.4 0 
s... 
a_ 0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
~ 0.7 0.6 
.c 0.5 C'O 
.c 0.4 0 
s... 
a_ 0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2 
-~----~~--·-_________--~=·>---+---+---+--· ... l
~ 
- ----. j 
~---------------------1 
--------------------------/----------------··-------·-----
0 0 
0 0 
f'.... (0 
I I 
0 0 
0 0 
lJ( 1" 
0 0 
0 0 
'? 'il 
0 
0 
'r-
1 
0 0 0 
0 0 
'r- (\J 
Time Available (s) 
0 0 
0 0 
(Y) "t' 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2.5 
+--
-
------
,----
0 
0 
f"-
1 
0 
0 (0 
I 
--
0 
0 
l() 
I 
-
·-----~-
0 
0 
"'1 
l 
0 
0 
(<) 
I 
0 
0 
N 
I 
I 
__.-/ 
0 
0 
...-
1 
' 
( 
I j 
I 
I 
J 
I 
J 
0 0 
0 
...-
Time Available (s) 
r 
0 
0 
N 
0 
0 
(<) 
0 
0 
"<:t 
' 
0 0 
0 0 
l() (0 
I 
I 
____ _J 
·~ !---· 
l 
-- .. ---------! 
' 
0 
0 
l() 
I 
·--·~i 
--
0 
0 
(0 
I 
l 
I 
! j 
102 
Scenario 9 - Smoke layer height used as tenability limit 
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Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2.5 
--------- ---- _ __j 
---------------+---------~----1 
--------------~------------~ 
i 
--------- --1 
-------------j---------------------
-------i 
----------------..~------------ -----1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
""" lO <D 
Scenario 10- Fractional equivalent dose (FED) used as tenability limit 
~ 
·-
.0 
ca 
..0 
0 
I.. 
a.. 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1 
1 --------
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 -
0 0 
0 0 
1'- <D 
I I 
---------------------~--... 'J 
0 
0 
lO 
I 
0 
0 
'1 
0 
0 
("<) 
I 
0 0 
0 0 N ...-
I I 
0 0 
0 
.......-
Time Available (s) 
0 
0 
N 
0 
0 
("<) 
0 
0 
"¢ 
0 
0 
lO 
0 
0 
<D 
105 
Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 1.2 
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Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2 
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Scenario 11 -Medium ventilation used 
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Distribution of Time Available after Egress SF= 2 
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Appendix 8 
@RISK Characteristics 
Effect of differing random seeds 
A comparison of random seeds versus two different levels of iterations was made. There 
was some level of variation between random seeds, as would be expected with pseudo-
random numbers. The difference between the use of 5000 and 10,000 iterations in 
@RlSK was significant to the accuracy of the simulation. This comparison was made 
without the use of Latin-Hypercube sampling in the simulation. 
..0 
co 
..0 
0 
lo.... 
a.. 
,-
Comparison of Random Seeds with the Number of 
Iterations Used 
0.15 
0.145 --j-~--'\----~~~~~~~--~~~~----1 
0.14 
0.135 +-~~-\ 
0.12 
0 91 111 I-+- Iterations 5000 0.1458 0.121003 0.13107 I 0.1273324 
-!!1- Iterations 1 0000 0.1309 0.1258 0.1313 0.1293 
'--
Figure 11 Effect of differing random seeds and number of iterations 
Looking at figure 10, the result of the simulation for 10,000 iterations has a reasonably 
linear result, whereas 5000 iterations produced some larger differences within the 
simulation. The variation between differing random seeds is less. So the usage of 10,000 
iterations in all simulations was selected. 
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All the input distributions were the same, only the random seed and the iterations were 
varied. 
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